LMPD’s Wearable Video System Implementation: Year One Report

A Report to Louisville Metro Police Department

By
Brian Schaefer
Brad Campbell
Thomas Hughes
John Reed

Southern Police Institute
Department of Criminal Justice
University of Louisville
LMPD’s Wearable Video System Implementation: Year One Report

A Report to Louisville Metro Police Department

Brian Schaefer, Ph.D.
Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice
Indiana State University

Bradley Campbell, Ph.D.
Thomas Hughes, J.D. Ph.D.
John Reed, Ph.D.
Southern Police Institute
Department of Criminal Justice
University of Louisville

Updated July 5, 2016

Copyright 2016
TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................. 5
IMPETUS FOR BODY-WORN CAMERAS ........................................... 7
DEPLOYMENT ................................................................................. 16
YEAR ONE PATTERNS .................................................................. 20
FUTURE DEVELOPMENT ............................................................... 28
APPENDIX A: LMPD WEARABLE VIDEO SYSTEM SOP ......................... 31
Executive Summary

In the fall 2012 Louisville Metro Police Department began researching the potential acquisition of a wearable video system (i.e., body-worn cameras), but faced budgetary restrictions in purchasing and implementing body-cameras. Following several national police-involved critical incidents, interest into body-worn cameras grew. After these events LMPD’s Administrative Division were instructed by the Chief to begin researching and testing body-worn camera systems. As the research progressed, LMPD created a team of personnel to evaluate which camera to purchase and simultaneously created an implementation team to help formulate policy and address questions related to the use body-cameras. In 2015, Louisville purchased 988 TASER Axon cameras systems along with signing a contract for unlimited storage through TASER’s data management system, evidence.com.

During the development stages LMPD relied on existing model policies from the Department of Justice, and reviewed policies from police departments who had already deployed body-worn cameras. During the policy phase, the department determined officers would be required to wear the cameras on the collar, shoulder, or head. Additional policy considerations included allowing officers to review footage before giving an official statement regarding complaints against an officer; requiring officers to record all calls-for-service runs; and when conducting any law enforcement activities.

Decisions were made to deploy body-worn camera in all nine patrol divisions, the Traffic Unit, Canine Unit, and SWAT team. Cameras were deployed first – as a pilot program – in the Fifth Division on June 1, 2015. The Fifth Division was chosen as a pilot study in order troubleshoot unintended or unidentified issues related to body-worn cameras. All personnel receiving body-worn cameras went through roll-call training to
learn how to operate the camera and instructions on when to use the cameras. The only issue to arise during the pilot study was the docking system used to upload footage which was quickly addressed. Body-worn cameras were then deployed to each of the patrol divisions, one at a time with the Sixth Division receiving their cameras in March 2016. The Traffic Unit received their cameras on June 29, 2016. The Canine Unit and SWAT team have not received their cameras, but will over the coming months.

LMPD also partnered with researchers at the University of Louisville and Indiana State University to conduct an outcome evaluation. Findings since the June 1, 2015 implementation focus on outcomes related to office use of force, complaints against officers, incidents of officers assaulted, and officer activity. The analysis presented in this report examined data from June 2014 through May 2016 to provide a one-year time period before and after body-camera implementation. The results show an aggregate decrease in the monthly average of use of force incidents, civilian complaints against officers, total number of complaints against officers, incidents of officers assaulted, and officer self-initiated activity and an increase in calls for service runs and chief-initiated complaints. Due to the staggered implementation across the nine divisions, the initial analysis is considered preliminary.

After one year of body-cameras implemented in LMPD, the department continues to monitor body-camera research and seeks out best practices. The department is working with several agencies to share information and policies. As a result of these continuing efforts the department seeks to use the body-cameras for future performance reviews and seeks to adopt technology that activates the camera when emergency lights are activated. As a whole the extensive research and planning conducted by LMPD resulted in an implementation process that faced few issues.
Impetus for Body-Worn Cameras

Louisville Metro Police Department (LMPD) began researching body-worn cameras (BWCs) in the fall of 2012. The department’s leadership realized early-on that policing trends were heading towards the use of BWCs as a means for increasing transparency and improving community relations. There was recognition that BWCs were being used as a tool to improve transparency and community relations after critical incidents. LMPD was using in-car cameras, and recognized the benefits of having an additional camera system to capture a critical incident. Instead of waiting for a critical incident to occur, the department was proactive in potential adoption of BWCs. LMPD’s Administrative Division was tasked with researching the possibility of purchasing and deploying body-worn cameras. The Administrative Division’s early research included a cost-analysis and the department realized they would face budgetary restraints in purchasing the cameras. The Administration Division realized the cameras themselves were relatively inexpensive, around $800 per camera, but the cost of data storage was prohibitive. As a result, the Command Staff shelved the project until they could come up with a budget solution to cover data storage costs. The Command Staff explored the possibility of acquiring grants to cover the costs of implementing body-worn cameras; however, these grants only covered the cameras and did not provide a monetary solution for the data storage.

During the Administrative Division’s early research into body-worn cameras, the cameras were an emerging technology and few major cities had implemented this new technology. During the initial research there was mild interest from local community and government; however, it was not until the events in Ferguson, Missouri that BWCs gained considerable local community and government support. Between the fall of 2012
and summer of 2013, the department continued to monitor developments in BWCs technology, policies, and research. Post-Ferguson there was a nationwide push for law enforcement agencies to implement body-cameras as soon as possible. With local community and government interest in body-worn cameras increasing Post-Ferguson, the department was able to develop a budget to purchase BWCs and data storage. Due to the prior research conducted by the Administrative Division, LMPD was able to move quickly to purchase and deploy cameras.

In fall 2013 LMPD the Administrative Division again began researching body-camera systems, and sent requests to six vendors for camera system samples. Upon reviewing these cameras, the Administrative Division established criteria for the type of camera they were interested in adopting. First, the department wanted to ensure the camera had a long battery life. At the time camera systems ranged from 4 hours to 12 hours. The cameras with a four-hour recording life were excluded, because the battery would not last an entire shift. Second, the department needed the cameras to be capable of being mounted on the head or shoulder. The administration indicated chest-mounted cameras did not provide sufficient view of incidents, especially critical incidents involving a discharge of a weapon. Once an officer drew his/her TASER or firearm, the officer’s arms blocked the camera and it did not capture the incident. As a result, the department sought camera mounts that provided a point-of-view perspective. Based on these two criteria, the Administrative Division identified two camera systems for further review.

Once the two cameras systems were identified, the Administrative Division formed a camera evaluation committee including the President of the Fraternal Order of Police, LMPD administration personnel, and Louisville Metro information technology
personnel. This committee was responsible for drawing up the specific request-for-proposals for the BWC criteria they were seeking. Eventually this committee chose the TASER Axon system and signed a five-year contract with TASER using a combination of funding streams. In total LMPD purchased 988 cameras. The money came from forfeiture funds, city general funds, and a $900,000 loan. As a whole LMPD’s total contract was $4.28 million and 96 percent of the program costs are associated with a cloud-based file management system through TASER called evidence.com that provides unlimited data storage across the life of the contract. Initially, the department was going to store the video footage on internal servers; however, the agreement to use a cloud-based file management system with unlimited storage provided a benefit to the department. In the first year of deployment the department as uploaded over 80 terabytes of data to the data management system.

Outside of purchasing the cameras and data storage, LMPD also faced costs related to expanding staff for the Open Records Unit. The department recognized that other cities were experiencing a flood of public information requests for BWC footage. Whether it was requests from the public, detectives, or the Courts other agencies were experiencing backlogs with open records requests. To reduce the likelihood of LMPD creating an instant backlog, three staff members were added to the Open Records Unit for the sole purpose of servicing public information requests related to video footage. In addition to adding staff, the department also purchased specialized redaction software to redact sensitive information that could be seen in body-camera footage. The redaction follows Kentucky state law, redacting personal identifying information such as NCIC information and juvenile records. The initial redaction software purchased on the
recommendation of the vendor did not meet expectations and a second redaction software product was purchased and staff trained.

**Forming an Implementation Team**

While the final purchasing decisions were ongoing, the department created an internal implementation team. The implementation team consisted of the FOP President, information technology personnel, LMPD administrative personnel, and officers from patrol, traffic unit, professional standards units, and members of the FOP. The implementation committee was used to formulate policies, deployment strategies, and act as soundboards for the rest of the department. To help formulate the policy, determine deployment strategies, and act as soundboards for the rest of the department. The implementation team developed strategies for explaining the program to the department and identify potential implementation hurdles. The implementation team also served the role of rumor control. Numerous rumors were generated and spread throughout the department and it was important for the implementation team to ensure LMPD personnel understand how the cameras would be used. The implementation team met every two weeks from January 2015 through May 2015. Prosecutors would also attend meetings to raise concerns and answer questions from officers. In addition to the implementation team, meetings were held with Command Staff members to explain the impetus for the adoption of BWCs and to ask them to cascade the purpose down to their employees. The use of implementation team and discussions with the command staff were vital for managing expectations of the cameras and explaining the purpose of the cameras.

**Meeting with the Community**

As LMPD moved closer to deploying the BWCs they met with community groups throughout the city to inform the public of policies, shared sample images of camera
footage, explained retention policies, and how the cameras would be used. The department held meetings specifically to address community concerns related to BWCs, but also discussed the cameras during meetings with neighborhood watch groups and general division-level community meetings, and community outreach programs. Discussions with community groups continue through these same mediums and through ad hoc meetings.

The community was also apprised of body-camera information through local media. Numerous articles were written detailing the costs, policies, and unanswered questions related to the adoption of BWCs. LMPD and the Mayor’s Office communicated through local media holding multiple interviews and providing numerous comments related to the BWC program, ensuring transparency through the planning and deployment phases. Further, LMPD allowed all local media outlets an opportunity to use a BWC during the pilot study.¹

The final component of meeting with the community was meeting with the local chapter of the ACLU. The primary discussion between LMPD and the ACLU focused on LMPD’s policies related to BWCs. Since 2012, the ACLU has provided a model body-camera policy to maximize the civil liberties of the public and police officers. LMPD reviewed the ACLU’s model policy and included many recommendations into their BWC policy. There were two areas in which the ACLU and LMPD disagreed on their policy (discussed below). Since the deployment of the BWCs LMPD and ACLU have not been in contact related to existing policies.

Policies

LMPD recognized that the adoption of policies were a key factor in determining the impact of body-worn cameras and its potential success for transparency. Three overarching themes guided their development of policy: maintain transparency with the community; ensure the cameras were a beneficial tool for the officers; and be in compliance with state laws. The following paragraphs discuss key policy decisions made by the department and identified by existing BWC policy recommendations and model policies. LMPD’s standard operating procedures\(^2\) for WVS (see also Appendix A) can be found online and is available for review to the public.\(^3\)

**Body Placement of cameras.**

LMPD requires officers to wear the WVS on the officer’s head or positioned on the collar of the officer’s uniform or plainclothes attire, using only the departmentally-issued mounting equipment. The purchased cameras came with a mounting kit with attachments to mount to the collar, shoulder, sunglasses, or hat. The camera kit also included a pair of sunglasses for officers to wear that included tinted and clear lenses. The Implementation team intended to require officers to wear head-mounted cameras. Upon discussing the camera position with officers and the FOP, concerns were raised regarding the head mounted position. Officers did not like the extra weight on their head. There was also concern with mounting the camera to sunglasses and having to switch the

---

\(^2\) The WVS Standard Operating Procedure can also be found online at https://louisvilleky.gov/sites/default/files/police/sop_searchable_and_reports/sop_searchable_05-08-16.pdf

camera to eyeglasses before entering buildings. Upon hearing the concerns of officers, the Administration included shoulder and collar mounts to ensure officers were comfortable in executing their duties; however, the shoulder mounts can only be used for plainclothes units and special applications and not for general use.

**When Should Officers Record.**

At the time LMPD adopted BWCs there was no standard for determining when officers should record interactions. LMPD command staff determined they would require to turn their cameras on during all law-enforcement related activities. The policy requires officers to record any calls-for-service and any involvement where law enforcement action is taken. The policy does not require officers to have the camera on during their entire shift. Officers are not required to inform the public they are being recorded.

The department also determined instances where they were not allowed to use cameras. LMPD personnel are not allowed to use cameras around suspected explosive packages and when working on federal tasks forces. Further, LMPD personnel are not allowed to use for personal use or to record roll call meetings, training, or supervisor reviews.

When an officer starts to record, the officers are afforded very little discretion in turning a camera off mid-interaction. The one scenario when officers are allowed to turn their camera off is when they are working with confidential informants. The department wants to ensure witnesses are protected and safety maintained, therefore, turning the camera off when working with confidential informants is paramount to ensuring their safety. LMPD does not allow officers to turn the camera off when talking to victims of crimes, despite recommendations from ACLU and other model policies. LMPD considered allowing officers to turn their camera off when interacting with domestic
violence victims; however, they determined protecting the victim outweighed concerns of privacy. In the few instances when a recording is stopped, officers are asked to give a statement as to why they are turning the camera off while still recording.

**Downloading procedures**

Officers must upload their WVS video at the end of their shift or at the beginning of their next shift. Initially, the department sought to require officers to upload by the end of their shift, but due to the volume of video this would not be realistic without causing officers to accumulate overtime pay. Another decision factor, was many officers work secondary employment. Policy requires officers working secondary employment in uniform to utilize the camera in the same manner as if they were on duty. By allowing officers to upload video at the end or beginning of the next shift, it ensures officers have access to their WVS system during their secondary employment. One issue with this policy is when officers leave for vacation it may take a week or more for video footage to be uploaded. However, supervisors can require officers to upload video of critical incidents or video of an event requiring an Administrative Incident Report, even if off-duty. All videos uploaded to the cloud-based data management system requires officers to appropriately categorize the video to ensure it receives proper review and is retained for the required amount of time.

**Supervisor Video Review**

WVS policies do require supervisors to review officer’s WVS video, but only in certain situations. Supervisors review every critical incident, any time an Administrative Incident Review form is filled out, including instances of use of force. Video footage must be reviewed by supervisors before preparing their reports related to critical incidents or Administrative Incident Reports. Supervisors are also required to periodically review
their officers’ video to make sure cameras are being used as directed and to check for any behavioral or operational issues. Supervisors are not required to document the videos they view; however, the data retention software maintains a built-in Evidence Audit Trail that automatically keeps track of who accesses videos.

**Reviewing Video before providing Statements**

LMPD allows officers to review WVS footage of any incident in which they were involved in before giving a statement. This includes critical incidents, Administrative Incident Reviews, or civilian complaints. This policy diverges from the ACLU’s recommendations; however, the command staff felt it was critical to get the most accurate statement possible from officers. The department had concerns that when officers are involved in critical incidents, there are physiological factors that limit memory recall. For instance, in officer-involved shootings it is common for officers to not know how many bullets they fired.\(^4\) Rather, then have officers give a statement from memory, get information wrong, and be accused of lying, the department wanted to ensure statements are accurate. Accusations of officers lying can lead to detrimental effects for an ongoing case and for the officer’s future as he/she could be placed on the *Brady* list.\(^5\)

**Data Retention**

The development of policies related to data retention evolved over the development stages. In the initial stages LMPD contacted the State Libraries and

---


\(^5\) See *Brady v. Maryland*, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963). The *Brady decision* requires police to turn over exculpatory evidence to the defense. Recent Supreme Court decisions have ruled that evidence maintained in a police officer’s personnel file that may affect the credibility of the police officer as a witness should be given to the defense during discovery. This applies especially to previous findings of officer untruthfulness.
Archives office for guidance on how long to store WVS footage. Upon the advice of the State Libraries and Archives office they were going to retain all video for 60 days; however, that number was later reduced to 30 days. Next the department examined state evidence requirements for various crimes, which would require video footage to be retained for a much longer period of time. In the end, for basic non-evidentiary video LMPD keeps video footage for 13 months. This ensures video footage is maintained through the statute of limitations of when they may experience a lawsuit or complaint. LMPD maintains a minimum standard of retaining video footage for 30 days for any video accidently recorded through inadvertent activation. Video footage of misdemeanor crimes must be maintained for 5 years and footage of felonies must be maintained for 50 years. Footage related to homicides or sex crimes are required to be maintained forever. The built-in Evidence Audit trail feature tracks when a video is deleted, and even if a video is deleted—manually or when scheduled—it is still recoverable for a seven-day grace period.

**Deployment**

The next major phase of implementation was the deployment of the cameras to the officers. The first decision in deployment is what personnel would receive the cameras. From the early stages of planning it was determined that all patrol officers would receive cameras. Patrol officers are the backbone of the department’s activities as they have the most interaction and contact with the public. All patrol officers, patrol sergeants, and patrol lieutenants are assigned body-worn cameras. After patrol was selected, command staff considered what other units have a lot of interaction with the public or the potential for controversial contact. Upon review of units it was determined that the 9th Mobile Division, Traffic Unit, Canine Unit, Division-level Flex Units, and
SWAT team would receive body-worn cameras. Units that were administrative or primarily operated out of offices were not assigned body-worn cameras; however, the department is perpetually monitoring situations to ensure appropriate units have BWCs.

The second decision in deployment was determining how the cameras would be deployed. The implementation team determined, through experience implementing past technologies in the department that the best approach to phasing in the WVSs were to deploy division-by-division. Further, the implementation team sought to conduct a 30-day pilot study in a single division in order to work out issues with policies, the camera docking system, and potential camera issues. The Fifth Division was chosen for the pilot study because it is a moderately active division and command staff felt that if there was a failure in the camera deployment it would not result in the program being killed across the department. There was concern by command staff that a failure in deployment could result in losing officer support, community support, or both.

Before any cameras were deployed all sworn personnel were required to read the WVS policy and sign-off on the policy. On June 1, 2015 cameras were deployed to Fifth Division. Initial training in the pilot division was conducted by the camera vendor and the Administrative Division staff received “train the trainer” training. Training was conducted during roll call training at each of the three roll calls for each of the three shifts in the Fifth Division. Once receiving vendor-led training, the Administrative Division completed training in the Fifth Division and completed training for all divisions and units receiving cameras. The Administrative Division determined training should be conducted by Command staff to clearly convey the importance of the cameras and to get buy-in. The roll-call training allowed training sessions to maintain small groups of officers, familiar with each other so questions would be asked. The roll-call training also served as
additional rumor control. Training lasted 1 hour to 1 hour and 45 minutes and focused on how to use the camera, circumstances when to use the camera, basic overview of the policy, how to upload and tag videos, and addressed questions and provided clarification when needed.

The pilot study revealed one major issue. The department’s docking solution for uploading WVS footage did not work. Initial strategy was to use a server rack with slide-out drawers for officers to dock their cameras, but the system failed. The officers had issues getting the equipment into the docking station and the equipment kept disconnecting when the drawers were opened and closed. A new canted docking station was created that provided easy access and fixed connections that solved uploading issues. A strategy that was rolled out to subsequent divisions. There were also several minor policy issues that were discovered. For instance, it was during the pilot phase that it was realized officers should not wear cameras when working with federal task forces or when responding to a bomb-threat.

Once the pilot study was completed, the department began rolling out the cameras to high-volume divisions. In the early stages of planning, community members in high-crime and low-income neighborhoods pushed for cameras to be on the streets as soon as possible. Chief Conrad and Mayor Fisher agreed to these requests. Table 1 provides the WVS deployment dates for each patrol division and unit receiving cameras.
### Table 1: WVS Deployment Date by Division

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fifth Division</td>
<td>June 1, 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Division</td>
<td>July 21, 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Division</td>
<td>August 4, 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Division</td>
<td>August 12, 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Division</td>
<td>August 18, 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninth Mobile Division</td>
<td>August 20, 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh Division</td>
<td>September 24, 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth Division</td>
<td>October 2, 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth Division</td>
<td>March 11, 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic Unit</td>
<td>June 29, 2016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Across the deployment for the other divisions there were issues that arose. For instance, in the Fourth Division the computer network connections were unable to handle the upload volume and required additional bandwidth being provided to the division. The Sixth Division and Traffic Unit did not have sufficient fiber connectivity and required new fiber optic cables to be connected to the division. This resulted in a delay in full implementation across the patrol divisions. Currently, the department is waiting to deploy cameras to the Canine Unit and SWAT team.

A third consideration in deployment was to develop a system to provide officer with replacement camera equipment when needed. Police departments are a 24 hour agency and officers working the night shift must be able to get replacement parts if something breaks on their camera. The WVS includes battery pack, cord, camera, and mounting equipment that could break. When a WVS component breaks officers are required to fill out a damage equipment form, explain how the equipment was broken, and have a supervisor sign-off on the form. Once the form is complete officers take the form to LMPD’s property room to receive replacement parts. LMPD’s property room is a 24 hour operation, and the implementation team provided the property room a shelf
supply of replacement parts. The Administrative division is responsible for ensuring the property room maintains a sufficient shelf supply of replacement parts.

The final component of the deployment process was to create feedback loops for officers to ask questions or address concerns. The Administration Division created an open door policy for personnel to raise issues or ask questions regarding the WVS. The Sergeant over the WVS project regularly visits divisions and maintains rapport with officers. The Administration team has regular contact with the FOP President. When the FOP President hears of rumors or issues he will contact the Administration team. Furthermore, since the FOP President was involved from the start with development and implementation he is able to address many issues or rumors himself.

YEARS ONE PATTERNS

Louisville Metro Police Department’s Fifth Division has deployed body-worn camera for over one-year as of June 1, 2016. Researchers and practitioners propose that body-worn cameras will yield several positive results for police personnel and for police-community relations including a reduction in use-of-force, reduction in civilian complaints, and reduction in assaults on officers. Conversely, researchers and practitioners suggest body-worn cameras may also result in fewer police-contacts with the public as they adjust to conducting their duties with a camera recording their every move.

The following section of the report presents year 1 trends related to LMPD officer’s use of force, complaints on officers, and incidents of officers assaulted, and

---

officer activity level. These results are preliminary and should be interpreted with caution. At the time of this report, only one LMPD division has possessed body-worn cameras for at least a year. A single-year post-implementation is not sufficient time to make any causal statements related to the impact of body-worn cameras. Furthermore, the investigation times required for complaints against officers and reviews of use-of-force incidents means data is not available yet for the entire year post-June 1, 2015. Finally, the reported trends do not take into account other factors that may lead to a reduction to the four outcomes. It is once again important to reiterate that the following data should be viewed as patterns and may not be long-term trends or caused by body-worn cameras.

**Officer Use-of-Force**

LMPD identifies a progression of use of force that includes: officer presence, verbal direction, soft empty hand control, chemical agent, CEW, hard empty hand, impact weapon, and deadly force. LMPD requires all instances of use-of-force resulting in an injury, or the complaint of any injury, the use of physical force other than a control hold to be documented through an Administrative Incident Report (AIR). All use of force incidents involving an AIR form is reviewed through the appropriate chain of command ending with the Chief’s office. All data used to analyze use of force was retrieved from the AIR reports generated by LMPD personnel following a use of force incident. The analysis uses use-of-force data from June 2014 through February 2016. The time period June 2014 through May 2015 is labeled as the pre-BWC time period and June 2015 through February 2016 is the post-BWC time period.

---

7 Data collection for use of force after February 2016 is incomplete due to ongoing command staff reviews and/or investigations into the use of force. Since the subsequent months are incomplete, the data analysis stopped with February 2016.
Figure 1 presents the monthly use-of-force incidents for the time period under study.

**Figure 1**

*Results should not be used for causal explanations.*

In June 2015, when body-cameras were deployed in the Fifth Division there were 26 use-of-force incidents across the department. In the post-BWC implementation time period, there were 47 use-of-force incidents in August 2015, however, these incidents dropped to a low of 15 in December 2015 and 17 incidents in February 2016. Comparing the pre-BWC and post-BWC time periods, Table 2 presents the average monthly incidents for the pre- and post-BWCs time periods. In the pre-BWC time period there were an average of 44.42 use-of-force incidents per month and in the post-BWC time period there was an average of 28.44 incidents for an average monthly decrease of 36 percent.

**Table 2: Average Monthly Use-of-Force Incidents Pre- and Post-Implementation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-BWC</th>
<th>Post-BWC</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44.42</td>
<td>28.44</td>
<td>-35.66%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Complaints

Louisville Metro Police Department’s Professional Standards Unit investigates internal and community allegations of violations of department rules. The Professional Standards Units receives complaints in one of two ways. First, civilians are able to contact the officer and place sign a complaint affidavit detailing an allegation of an office violating policy. The complaint affidavit must articulate a policy violation for the Professional Standards Unit to investigate the complaint. Second, the Professional Standards Unit can receive a “Chief initiation” complaint. A “chief initiated” complaint comes from the Chief’s office and can stem from a vehicle accident resulting in unsafe driving, or a phone call from a concerned community member. If the Chief deems the alleged complaint sufficient for further investigation, he can submit an allegation letter to the Professional Standards Unit to begin an investigation.

The following data distinguishes between civilian complaints and Chief initiated complaints filed to the Professional Standards Unit. The chief initiated data does not included investigations into non-law enforcement related allegations. 8This data does not contain complaints filed at the division level. Each Division can receive complaints and take care of minor issues in house, therefore, the data below does not account for all potential civilian complaints, rather only those that are investigated by the Professional Standards Units. The data include monthly complaint data from June 2014 through June 2016.9 All complaint data coincides with the date the complaint was received as opposed

---

8Chief initiated investigations not included in the analysis involved officers being accused for criminal activity, off-duty behaviors, and civilian employee investigations.
9 All complaints received as of June 21, 2016 were included in the analysis.
to the date the allegation occurred. Furthermore, the data include all allegations regardless of the investigations outcome. Figure 2 presents the monthly complaints.

**Figure 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complaints Against Officers</th>
<th>June 2014 to May 2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief Initiated</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Results should not be used for causal explanations.

Figure 2 shows that in June 2015 there were a total of 11 complaints received by the Professional Standards Unit, 7 complaints were Chief Initiated and 4 complaints were filed by citizens. In June 2016 there were a total of 4 complaints. Examination of the average number of complaints pre-BWC (June 2014-May 2015) and post-BWC (June 2015-June 2016) indicate the number of citizen complaints as dropped slightly and Chief-initiated complaints have slightly increased as shown in Table 3. Overall, complaints against officers decreased from a monthly average of 6.83 pre-BWC to 6.31 in the months following implementation, a 7% decrease in total complaints.
Table 3: Average Monthly Complaints Pre- and Post-Implementation¹⁰

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complaint Type</th>
<th>Pre-BWC</th>
<th>Post-BWC</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief Initiated</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>4.77</td>
<td>+14.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Affidavit</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>-3.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6.83</td>
<td>6.31</td>
<td>-7.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Incidents of Officers Assaulted**

Researchers and practitioners suggest that body-worn cameras are likely to reduce incidents of officers assaulted because civilians will be less likely to strike an officer when they are being recorded. The data presented below reviews the monthly incidents of officers assaulted from June 2014 and May 2016. Figure 3 displays a series of peaks and valleys after the June 2015 implementation. There were 67 incidents of officers assaulted in June 2015. There were a high of 84 incidents of officers assaulted in January 2016 and a low of 41 incidents in March 2016.

**Figure 3**

*Results should not be used for causal explanations.*

¹⁰Data analysis that includes all chief initiated investigations change the post-BWC monthly average for Chief-initiated complaints to 6.77 and the total number of post-BWC complaints to 8.30. The difference in results due to measurement is a reminder that body-worn cameras will not always play a role in allegations of officer wrong doing.
The monthly average of incidents in the pre-BWC and post-BWC time periods indicates there were an average of 82.41 monthly incidents of officers assaulted before body-cameras and 64.75 incidents of officers after cameras were deployed, a decrease of 21 percent as shown in Table 4.

Table 4: Average Monthly Incidents of Officers Assaulted Pre- and Post-Implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-BWC</th>
<th>Post-BWC</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>82.41</td>
<td>64.75</td>
<td>-21.43%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Officer Activity

The final outcome area associated with body-worn cameras is an analysis of officer activity. Body-camera implementation guides and research suggest officers may reduce the number of contacts they have with the public as a result of the cameras. The following data analyzes the monthly calls for service runs and officer initiated activity for LMPD from June 2014 through May 2016. Figure 4 presents the patterns over time. In June 2015 officers responded to 28,063 calls for service and conducted 12,325 officer initiated runs. In May 2016 officers responded to 31,995 calls for service and conducted 9,166 officer initiated activities.

Figure 4

*Results should not be used for causal explanations.*
Table 5 presents the average monthly count of officer activity for the pre- and post-BWC time periods. In the pre-BWC time period (June 2014 through May 2015) officers responded to an average of 25,766 calls for service and initiated 15,233 runs and in the post-BWC time period (June 2015 through June 2016) officers responded to a monthly average of 29,268 calls for service and initiated 12,424 runs. The results indicate that officers saw a reduction in their self-initiated activity, however they responded to a greater number of calls-for-service. In sum, officers saw a slight increase in the average monthly runs in the post-BWC time period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-BWC</th>
<th>Post-BWC</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Calls-for-Service</td>
<td>25,766</td>
<td>29,269</td>
<td>+13.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer Initiated</td>
<td>15,234</td>
<td>12,424</td>
<td>-18.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>41,332</td>
<td>41,693</td>
<td>+0.87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary

After body-worn cameras were deployed in the Fifth Division on June 1, 2016 LMPD has experienced an average monthly reduction in officer use-of-force, civilian complaints, incidents of officers assaulted, and officer initiated activity and an average monthly increase in the total number of calls-for-service and total number of officer activity. The presented findings are preliminary and do not represent trends. The findings also do not rule out other possible explanations for changes in use of force, complaints, incidents of officers assaulted, and officer activity. Due to the deployment strategy, data is not available for each division one-year after implementation to conduct a complete analysis. The Year Two report will provide division-by-division breakdowns of trends on
these four outcomes and will conduct statistical tests to determine if the implementation of body-worn cameras are driving the changes in the number and type of officer use-of-force, complaints against officers, incidents of officers assaulted, and officer activity levels. Until that time all results presented in this report should be considered preliminary.

**Future Development**

To-date the implementation of LMPD’s wearable video system has required the combined efforts of LMPD, the Mayor’s Office, and the community. The Louisville Metro Police Department spent over two-and-a-half years planning, developing, and deploying their wearable video systems and the time spent is reflected in the minimal challenges faced since implementation. LMPD has successfully outfitted all patrol divisions with body-worn cameras and will complete deployment to the Canine Unit and SWAT team in the coming months. The department does not foresee any immediate changes to the policy; however, that could change as new situations or critical incidents arise. The department continues to monitor published reports, recommendations from the Police Executive Research Forum, Department of Justice, International Association of Chiefs of Police, and other resources to look for best practices. LMPD also is in contact with numerous law enforcement agencies in the United States, sharing experiences and policies.
In the past year of implementation the department has identified four areas for future development. As part of the President’s 21st Century Policing Initiative the department seeks to implement performance reviews in the future using WVS footage. The purpose of the performance review is to have supervisors meet with officers to review video and discuss the good, bad, and general performance of the officer in relation to using the camera. The performance review is meant to provide continuing training at the division level and as a way to incorporate available technology to training.

The department also intends to deploy technology that allows the camera to be activated by preprogrammed triggers, such as when officers turn their vehicle emergency lights on the camera would also turn on. It is possible that the Computer-Aided Dispatch system could also turn the camera on for certain runs. The department has purchased the technology, but is waiting for a lawsuit between vendors to be settled before deploying.

The department intends to expand the number of staff in the Open Records Unit. The Open Records Unit is beginning to experience a backlog on fulfilling video requests. The vast majority of requests come through the Court system. Prosecutors have access to view videos in the data-management system but they are not able to download the video. This requires the prosecutors to submit a request to the public information office. Similarly, LMPD personnel are able to view the video, but not download the footage, therefore officers or detectives working cases must request video for the investigation.
files. A fourth staff member to handle body-camera footage video quests will eliminate the backlog and ensure prosecutors and detectives are able to move their investigations or prosecutions forward.

Finally, the department intends to set aside a block of time during officer’s mandatory training to review policies and to update officers on any new technologies or uses of the camera. The training will be used to address reoccurring issues related to how officers use the cameras. For instance, emphasizing to officers that they should turn the camera on while on their way to a scene and not wait until they arrive and forget to turn the camera on because they are focused on addressing the situation at hand.
APPENDIX A: LMPD WEARABLE VIDEO SYSTEM STANDARD OPERATING

PROCEDURE